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THE GREEN PAPER FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Due to a treaty reservation to Article 25(b) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region (HKSAR) Government says that the right to universal
suffrage is not a treaty right applicable to Hong Kong. So we have to ask
whether there is a legal right to universal suffrage, and if so where that
right comes from. The 2007 Green Paper on Constitutional Development
suggests some possible answers.' This document has an important con-
stitutional dimension in its bearing on democratic rights in Hong Kong,
quite apart from its object of constitutional reform. Its tone, language and
content are riddled with implicit constitutional assumptions and theories.
This short commentary argues, against a reading of the Green Paper, that
(1) universal, equal suffrage is a constitutional entitlement with a "minimal
content", (2) that the Green Paper acknowledges this, and that aside from
its acknowledgement in the Green Paper, (3) that constitutional right regu-
lates both the content of the Green Paper and its consultation process.
1. The "Not a Treaty Right" Argument
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) says that universal, equal suffrage is
a legal right applying to Hong Kong, and that Hong Kong is in violation of
this right.4 The Government claims the existence of a valid treaty reserva-
tion. The HRC has responded by repeating its earlier view, first expressed
in relation to Britain's report on behalf of pre-handover Hong Kong, that
the treaty carve-out only works in so far as Hong Kong did not have, and
was not required to have, an elected legislature at the time. Since Hong
Kong now has an elected legislature, Article 25 of the ICCPR should be ob-
served.' The Government says this is just the HRC's opinion. In any event,
the whole debate is moot since Hong Kong is not after all in breach:8
GA res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 52, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS
171, entered into force 23 Mar 1976.
"Hong Kong SAR Government Welcomes Constructive Dialogue with the UN Human Rights
Committee", Hong Kong Economic & Trade Office News Release, United States, 3 April 2006
(statement of Carrie Lam).
Green Paper on Constitutional Development, July 2007.
UN Doc CCPR/C/HKG/CO/2, 21 April 2006, para 18, reiterating its view in UN Doc CCPR/
C/79/Add.57, 9 Nov 1995, para 19.
Ibid.
6 Ibid.
See n 2 above.
' Ibid.
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"Hong Kong's electoral system shall be determined in accordance with
the Basic Law and the Decision of the NPCSC of April 2004. Our elec-
toral system is appropriate to Hong Kong's circumstances and gives rise
to no incompatibility with any of the provisions of the Covenant [the
ICCPR] as applied to the HKSAR."
The upshot is that the HRC's views do not matter much at the end of the
day. An ungenerous way of putting it might be to say that if the reports get
the right result then they hold value, but where they lead to unwelcome
answers then they do not matter. This would be a strange view for the
Government to hold to the extent that the HKSAR Government has con-
sistently felt compelled to address the other views of the Committee as well
as those of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.' Of
course, the Government's position might simply be that the HRC has got it
wrong. That is what the Government means when it says that Hong Kong
is not, after all, in breach of its treaty obligations. What is missing here is
why the Government thinks that its view should prevail as a matter of legal
principle.
One answer could be that Hong Kong's Basic Law trumps Hong Kong's
international obligations, at least as a matter of Hong Kong's domestic law.
That would not be an unusual view to take as a matter of constitutional
principle when we look at other jurisdictions which accept such a dualist
view of the relationship between the domestic and international legal order.
Secondly, Hong Kong might simply adopt the view that the HRC cannot
pronounce on the scope and validity of reservations to the ICCPR, or sever
invalid reservations.10 This is a controversial area of international law, but
the United States and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office have
taken the same view."
In sum, the statements quoted above mean that the Basic Law is what
we really should be looking at, and that for these purposes Hong Kong's
participation in the ICCPR and ICESCR is legally irrelevant at least to
For the latest report to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see Second Re-
port of the HKSAR to the International Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(submitted in June 2003 as part of People's Republic of China's Initial Report, available at http://
www.hab.gov.hk.
10 Human Rights Committee General Comment No 24 on Issues Relating to Reservations Made to
the ICCPR, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994); 34 ILM 839 (1995). I am not saying that
an issue of severance is necessarily involved, that being a legal question.
" Observations of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom on General Com-
ment No 24, GAOR, UN Doc A/50/40, Annex VI (1995); (1995) 16 Human Rights Law Journal
422,424. However, the International Law Commission has said that treaty monitoring bodies such
as the HRC do have the power to comment and to make recommendations in this regard; Report
of the ILC on the work of its 49th Session (1997), GAOR, 52nd Session, Supp No 10 (A/52/10),
paras 5, 6 and 8.
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the question of democratic rights. Facially, both responses would have the
colour of law. The discourse at the international level which the HKSAR
Government has said it welcomes over the question of universal, equal suf-
frage would at least be conducted on a legal plane. Elsewhere, this seems
not to be the view taken by the HKSAR Government, which appears to
claim some sort of Hong Kong "exceptionalism" by appealing to Hong
Kong's "uniqueness",12 but it might be suggested that this is really a refer-
ence to the uniqueness of the Basic Law, and the system of "one country,
two systems", not to the fact that there is a legal black hole on the question
of democratic rights in Hong Kong.
The Government appears to contemplate, in varying degrees, both argu-
ments above. The Green Paper makes this plainest where it says:
"Upon ratification of the Covenant in 1976, a reservation was made re-
serving the right not to apply sub-paragraph (b) of Article 25. After the
establishment of the HKSAR, in accordance with the CPG's notifica-
tion to the United Nations ("UN") Secretary-General in June 1996 and
Article 39 of the Basic Law, this reservation continues to apply to the
HKSAR. Hence, the ultimate aim of universal suffrage for Hong Kong's
constitutional development originates from the Basic Law, and not the
Covenant."
Thus, the Government claimed that, contrary to the HRC's views, Hong
Kong has a valid reservation, and that this cuts out Article 25 of the IC-
CPR leaving the Basic Law as the only source of these democratic rights.
The reasoning above is not entirely explicit, and it can be teased out fur-
ther to a point. What the Government seems to be saying is that Article 25
of the ICCPR is incorporated via Article 39's indirect reference to the Bill
of Rights Ordinance 1991 (BRO);14 namely, through Article 21 of the Bill
of Rights. Crucially, the reservation to the ICCPR is also incorporated into
Hong Kong law only via section 13 of the BRO. How else could it make its
way into Hong Kong law? After all, treaty laws are not automatically a part
of Hong Kong law, and the Government has said (above) that the whole
issue of democratic rights is governed by Hong Kong law; namely, the Basic
Law. It is only in this (limited) sense that the Basic Law, or the Govern-
ment's reading of it and of the BRO, trumps whatever the HRC says about
what Article 25 of the ICCPR means.
12 Green Paper, n 3 above, para 6.03, for example.
13 Ibid., para 2.20.
14 (Cap 383). For recent dicta, see (eg) Leung Kwok Hung and Others v Hong Kong SAR (8/7/2005,
FACC 1 and 2/2005), paras 19 and 20 (Li CJ, Chan and Ribeiro PJJ, Mason NPJ). But cf Simon
Young, "Restricting Basic Rights in Hong Kong", (2004) 34 HKLJ 134.
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All this still leaves the following question open: what does the Basic
Law itself say about democratic rights? All we know is that the Chief Execu-
tive is reported to have said (and presumably he states the Government's
position on this) that while the Hong Kong meaning of "universal suffrage"
would meet international standards, Article 25 of the ICCPR would not
apply in Hong Kong. 5 Presumably, this need not mean that the "incorpora-
tion of the reservation" in section 13 of the BRO limits or qualifies "universal
suffrage" within the meaning given to it by the Basic Law. As one commen-
tator has pointed out, such a view would entail the extinguishment of the
entire category of "parallel rights" (ie those found in both Chapter III of the
Basic Law and in Part II of the BRO). Just amend the BRO and you will eat
away the Basic Law. 6
2. The Basic Law and the "Deferred Entitlement" Theory
So what does the Basic Law itself say about democratic rights? It is well-
known that both Basic Law Articles 45 and 68 state that "universal
suffrage" is "the ultimate aim", and that the right to vote, and to stand for
elections may be found also in Article 26. One understanding of this was
that, after 2007, it would be for the Hong Kong people to choose.
The constitutional issue of the day is based partly on the fact that the
"ultimate aim" clause is to be read, subject to, other clauses which require
the "actual situation" in the HKSAR to be taken into consideration. More
specifically, they require that any change to the method of selection of both
the Chief Executive and the members of the Legislative Council (LegCo)
should be both "gradual and orderly"." On this view "ultimate" means "one
day, but not too soon". It is one interpretation and there does not appear
to be a better legal and constitutional explanation of what we actually see
happening today. Putting political explanations aside, the need for further
public consultation is squared with a legal entitlement to universal suffrage,
and with the idea that the Hong Kong people are to choose after 2007,
if the legal entitlement is interpreted as a non-immediate, and certainly
non-automatic, entitlement to universal, equal suffrage. It is a deferred en-
titlement. As the Green Paper puts it:1 8
"It is generally understood that "gradual and orderly progress" means
15 "UN Panel is Asked to Join in Debate on Democracy", South China Morning Post, 23 August 2007.
16 Young, n 14 above, 122.
17 See Basic Law, Arts 45 and 68.
18 Green Paper, n 3 above, para 2.16.
(2007) HKLJ
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proceeding step by step in an orderly fashion to move forward. It in-
volves a step by step transition, and different stages of evolution over
time. With regard to arriving at the ultimate aim of selecting the CE
and electing all members of LegCo by universal suffrage, the evolution-
ary process could not be taken forward too rapidly, and should proceed
in a gradual and orderly manner and in the light of the actual situation
in the SAR, in order to preserve its prosperity and stability."
It goes against the usual understanding of a right qua human right. Profes-
sor Charles Fried once pointed out that what characterises a right is that it
is to be enjoyed "here and now"." Seen in the present context, the phrase
"ultimate aim" would suggest not the deferment, but the importance of the
right instead. And that, likewise, the "gradual and orderly" as well as the
"actual situation" clauses are not words of limitation but are instead subject
to the "ultimate aim" clause. This is what makes universal, and we might
add "equal",20 suffrage a right in Hong Kong.
Yet it is important to notice that the "deferred entitlement" theory does
not mean that no legal, or indeed constitutional, right exists, or that even if
it does, that right is somehow devoid of content.
3. Distinguishing "Compatibility" from "Zero Obligation"
It cannot mean that the Basic Law either (1) says nothing, that being the
reason then that consultation is required on democratic or other grounds,
or (2) that it only requires that the people of Hong Kong should be con-
sulted, and only consulted (ie that they have no legal entitlement beyond
that). While there has been ample controversy over the latest consultation
exercise, there seems to have been no disagreement that there should be a
consultation exercise. Part of the explanation here is that the consultation
exercise acknowledges and implements a deferred constitutional entitle-
ment to universal suffrage. Put simply, the whole consultation exercise
means that what we have is a constitutional right.
Yet the idea of consultation, once accepted, can wear away or wither
a legal entitlement to suffrage. Consultation can be a double-edged sword
where, for example, it is taken mistakenly to suggest that consultation is
19 Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 113.
2 See the Basic Law's equality provision, Art 25. It is virtually inconceivable that this provision is
also, somehow, qualified by the reservation to ICCPR, Art 25, and Art 21 of the Bill of Rights Or-
dinance 1991 (Cap 383). The qualifying provision, namely BRO s 13, merely states that "Article
21 [of the Bill of Rights] does not require the establishment of an elected Executive or Legislative
Council in Hong Kong".
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needed precisely because there is a lacuna in the Basic Law, or if it is taken
to mean that the Hong Kong people are entitled only to consultation as
opposed to choice. Neither of these meanings would be acceptable if con-
sultation is not to stand accused of eroding the legal entitlement to suffrage.
Two clear issues stand out. First, once consultation is accepted as a le-
gitimate device, such acceptance amounts to an understanding that it is
being used to fulfil (and only to fulfil) the demands of the Basic Law. Sec-
ondly, the Basic Law demands universal suffrage, at some point after 2007.21
These issues, viewed clearly, throw light on what the Green Paper means
in constitutional terms. It means that the process which the Green Paper
stands for is regulated by the terms of the Basic Law; even if, accepting the
Government's view, it is not governed by, or is at least not contrary to, in-
ternational law.
4. A "Substantive" Constitutional Rule
So far as public attention is concerned, much of it seems to be focused on
the range and bewildering variety of the options in the Green Paper.22 But
we cannot neglect a more important question. Universal suffrage has be-
come a slogan today. What it could, and perhaps should, mean is "universal,
equal suffrage", or even "complete, universal, equal suffrage"; by which we
mean that (1) the Chief Executive should be returned by direct popular
election on the basis of one person, one vote, and that (2) all LegCo seats
should be returned on the same basis.
Let us get back to what we know about the Government's views. First,
that the international obligations which apply to Hong Kong do not wholly
agree with what the Human Rights Committee has said; that in any case,
Hong Kong is in compliance; and that the Basic Law, as interpreted by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (the NPCSC) in
its decision of 26 April 2004, governs the issue. Does this mean that there
is no Basic Law obligation as such excepting the NPCSC's decision?24 This
would be the idea of a Basic Law right without content.
21 Basic Law, Annex I, Art 7; Annex II, Art III.
22 See (eg) Albert Wong, "Anson Chan Slams Green Paper in Open Letter", South China Morning
Post, 4 August 2007; Anson Chan Fang On-sang, "An Open Letter to Donald Tsang", South China
Morning Post, 4 August 2007.
" The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Article 7 of
Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China, adopted 6 April 2004.
24 See further, Johannes Chan and Lison Harris, "The Constitutional Journey: The Way Forward"
in Johannes Chan and Lison Harris (eds), Hong Kong's Constitutional Debates (Hong Kong: HKLJ,
2005), 143.
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The preferable view, the more accurate view, would be that the text of
the Basic Law actually "says something". If the Basic Law text does not say
anything substantive, beyond what the NPCSC says, it would mean very
little to say that the terms of the Basic Law govern the issue.
5. But a "Thin" Rule
Yet saying that the Basic Law has something to say - eg that it says at least
that there is a deferred legal entitlement to democratic governance - need
not amount to very much beyond that. The constitutional rule at play is
elastic - suffrage could come in 2012, 2017 or indeed on some other later
date. 25 What we do know, even according to this "thin view" of the Con-
stitution, where "ultimate" means "eventual" as opposed to "foremost",
is that suffrage must come and that, beyond a certain leeway of constitu-
tional judgment, the constitutional chord will snap. At that point, short of
amendment to the Basic Law, we will have a constitutional violation.
The Green Paper raises all these questions. It does so not only because it
seeks to consult the people of Hong Kong on a very wide range of possibili-
ties, but because it reiterates some of the Government's earlier views about
the principles of reform. Once we accept that the Hong Kong people have
a constitutional albeit deferred entitlement to democratic governance, then
at most they can delay but not waive their entitlement. In this sense, it
would be inaccurate to say that the Basic Law "promises" universal suffrage.
You can waive a promise. But you cannot waive away a constitutional right.
So when does too much delay or deferment start to wither away that consti-
tutional right?
Is it where the Green Paper includes proposals that suffrage should ar-
rive only in 2020? How about 2024 ?21 What if the "Basic Law Institute's"
proposal is accepted and no deadline at all needs to be considered at this
stage ?2' The "deadline" issue arose in 2005 when a timetable was demanded
by pro-democrats though in vain.28 This time, however, a timetable seems
to be one of the clearer objectives of the Green Paper's consultation pro-
cess.
* See (eg) "Agree to 2017, Allen Lee Urges Pan-Democrat Camp", South China Morning Post, 24 Au-
gust 2007; "Strongest Hint Yet by Beijing on Suffrage", South China Morning Post, 23 August 2007.
26 Green Paper, n 3 above, 47 (citing the Honourable Rita Fan and the Liberal Party, respectively, for
these two dates).
21 Ibid.
z See Albert H.Y. Chen, "The Fate of the Constitutional Reform Proposal of October 2005", (2005)
35 HKLJ 537.
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Three important qualifications need to be made to all this, which
otherwise seems reasonably promising. First, the Green Paper actually
contemplates a date "after 2017" in the case of elections for Chief Execu-
tive,29 coupled with an only marginally more palatable notion of reform "in
phases after 2016" in the case of LegCo electoral reform.30 This last is only
more palatable because the phrase "in phases" suggests that actual, progres-
sive steps will be required, and that simple delay will not suffice. But still,
we may not know anything about the actual pace and eventual deadline.
This first problem has to do with the content of the Green Paper. It has to
do with the questions which the Green Paper asks, some of which may fall
outside acceptable constitutional bounds. The constitutional requirements
are flexible, but not infinitely so. Deferment is constitutionally finite.
Secondly, some of the Government's long-standing assumptions about
the legal principles governing the suffrage debate are reiterated in the
Green Paper. Does the process of consultation mean that public participa-
tion in the consultation process is tantamount to public acceptance of these
purported legal principles? Examples include the notion of an "executive-led"
government,3 a controversial idea." But perhaps it should not be. As with
"balanced participation" which also appears about five times in the Green
Paper,33 the notion of an "executive-led" system has at least the authority
of the NPCSC's April 2004 decision. But there are other ideas, such as the
idea that the road to suffrage is to be built on the back of societal "consensus",
a euphemism which occurs 19 times in the Green Paper but which finds
scant support in the Basic Law. In short, the principles which purportedly
govern constitutional reform in Hong Kong seem, at least from the Govern-
ment's standpoint, to be multiplying at a rapid rate.3 4 The Green Paper is a
part of that phenomenon.
Thirdly, "Green Papers" by definition do not bind Government, and we
turn to this last issue.
2 Ibid., para 5.15 - option "(iii)".
0 Ibid., para 5.19 - option "(iii)".
31 Green Paper, n 3 above, see (eg) para 2.12.
32 Compare Peter Wesley-Smith, "The Hong Kong Constitutional System: The Separation of Powers,
Executive-Led Government, and Political Accountability"; Albert Chen, "'Executive-Led Govern-
ment', Strong and Weak Governments and 'Consensus Democracy"', in Chan and Harris (eds), n
24 above, 3, 9, respectively.
33 Green Paper, n 3 above, see (eg) para 2.12.
1 Benny Tai, "One Principle.. .Two Principles.. .3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Factors for Constitutional Reform",
in Chan and Harris (eds), n 24 above, 15.
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6. Conclusion
There is no need to belabour the point. Readers of this journal know that
there are constitutional parameters here, even if it is difficult to say exactly
where some of those parameters lie. Could the Green Paper have observed
these parameters more closely? The fact is that we know too little about
the weight which will finally be accorded to this latest exercise. What the
Green Paper says is that "following the end of the consultation period in
October this year, the HKSAR Government will submit a report to the
Central Authorities to reflect faithfully any mainstream views formed
during the public consultation period and other views expressed".3 1 "Main-
stream"? And so there have been criticisms here.36 It suffices to add only
that such criticism is not without some constitutional basis or import.
That is where things stand, for now.
C.L. Lim
3 Ibid., para 1.19.
36 See "An Open Letter to Donald Tsang"; n 22 above, seeking an "explanation of the methodology
for assessing public opinion".
Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong. I thank Dean Johannes Chan and Professor Richard
Cullen for discussing some of my views with me. All errors are my own.
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